Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Logical knowledge: Logical knowledge is knowledge that must be true based on logical principles. It includes statements about the necessity or impossibility of statements. See also Necessity, Possibility, Truth, Statements, Logical constants, Truth values, Valuation, Knowledge._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Hartry Field on Logical Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments
I 88 Logical knowledge/Field/(s): knowledge about the fact that something is logically true (e.g. that the axioms are consistent), but not the axioms themselves. >Axioms. FieldVsKripke: we then introduce a non-Kripkean concept of logical truth, according to which some non-trivial assertions about possibility are part of the logic. - Then the consistency of axioms becomes a logical truth. >Truth/Kripke. Induction/Field: extra-logical means: empirical - because we find no contradiction. I 94 Logical Knowledge/Frege: Problem: whereby do I know that it is logically possible that the axioms of quantum theory are true: by asserting that I know that there are actually entities asserted by the axioms. >Quantum theory. FieldVsFrege: if these entities existed, how could one know then that they are in this relationship and not in another? I 113 Pure Logical Knowledge/Field: must be knowledge that makes no existence assumptions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |